United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
MICHAEL A. MURPHY, Petitioner,
STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. Trauger, United States District Judge.
Michael A. Murphy, an inmate of the Rutherford County
Sheriff's Office, filed a pro se petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No.
1). The petitioner alleges that he is not receiving credit
for all of the days he served in jail before his state
criminal trial. According to the petitioner, he is “due
the entire eight (8) days a month for the entire 317 days
pre-trial jail confinement” which amounts to 84 days;
however, according to the petitioner, he is only receiving 48
days of pre-trial jail credit. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-5). The
respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (Doc.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a writ of habeas corpus extends
to a prisoner “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treatises of the Unites
States[.]” A petition for a writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 generally arises from “a challenge to the
manner in which a sentence is executed, rather than the
validity of the sentence itself.” Capaldi v.
Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing
United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir.
1991)). An incarcerated state petitioner may use 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 to challenge the execution of a sentence, the
manner in which a sentence is being served, or claims
generally pertaining to the computation of parole or
sentencing credits. Ali v. Tenn. Bd. of Pardon and
Paroles, 431 F.3d 896, 896 (6th Cir. 2005);
Greene v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 265 F.3d 369,
372 (6th Cir. 2001). But see Allen v. White, 185
Fed.Appx. 487, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “there
exists some question whether state prisoners may ever proceed
under § 2241”).
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases apply to habeas petitions
filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Rule 1(b), § 2254
Rules. Under Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the
court is required to review a petition filed under Section
2241 promptly and determine whether “it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” The court's preliminary review under Rule 4
reveals that the petitioner is not entitled relief in this
court lacks jurisdiction to consider any case or issue that
has “lost its character as a present, live
controversy” and thereby becomes moot. See Demis v.
Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246
(1971) (citations omitted)). “‘Simply stated, a
case is moot when the issues presented are no longer
‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.'” Int'l Union v.
Dana Corp., 697 F.2d 718, 720-21 (6th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496,
(1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]ootness
is a jurisdiction question.” Demis, 558 F.3d
508, 511 (citing Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477, (1990)). The requirement of a case or
controversy exists throughout every stage of a federal
judicial proceeding. Id. (citing Lewis, 494
U.S. at 477-78).
prisoner's challenge to the validity of his conviction
“always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement,
because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the
terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by
the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the
conviction.” Id. (citing Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “Once a
prisoner's sentence has expired, however, ‘some
concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended
incarceration or parole-some collateral consequence of the
conviction-must exist if the suit is to be
maintained.'” Id. (quoting
Spencer, 523 U.S. 1, 7) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, to establish jurisdiction in the instant
case, “‘it is not enough that a dispute was alive
when [Murphy's] habeas corpus petition was filed in the
district court. [Murphy] must continue to have an actual
injury that is capable of being redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.'” Id. (quoting
Brock v. United Stated Dept. of Justice, 256
Fed.Appx. 748, 750 (6th Cir. 2007)).
the petitioner challenges the calculation of his sentence. He
does not challenge any collateral consequence resulting from
his conviction. He did not seek any damages or other relief
from any alleged injuries that would persist after his
release. He only sought to have the court rule that he was
entitled to more pre-trial jail credit. The petitioner was
released from the custody of the Rutherford County Jail on
October 28, 2019, due to the expiration of his felony
sentences in Case F71644. (Doc. No. 11, Attach. 1 at 1).
Because the petitioner's sentence has expired and he has
been released from state custody, there is no actual injury
that is capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial
decision in this case. Therefore, this action is moot and
must be dismissed. See Demis, 558 F.3d 508, 512
(affirming district court's finding that § 2241
petition seeking injunctive and declarative relief was moot
after prisoner was released from custody).
the petitioner already has been released from custody, this
court can no longer offer any meaningful relief. Therefore,
the petition is DENIED ...