United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING CASE, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT
BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE
FILING FEE AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF RESTRICTIONS UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g)
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
September 18, 2019, Plaintiff Larry Lashaida Wilborn, who is
incarcerated at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center in
Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) After
Wilborn submitted the necessary documents, the Court issued
an order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 8.) The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center
(Jail); the Memphis Police Department (MPD) Homicide Bureau;
MPD Sergeant B. Byrd; and MPD Detective B. Adams.
alleges he was pulled over by unnamed MPD officers on April
10, 2018, but the officers would not give him a reason for
the traffic stop. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) They arrested him,
handcuffed him, and took him “down town.”
(Id.) Wilborn alleges he was left in a room for two
hours and then taken to another room where Sergeant Byrd and
another detective were waiting. (Id.) Byrd and the
other detective showed him photos of two of Wilborn's
friends and told him that one of them had been killed.
(Id.) Wilborn denied knowing anything about the
killing. (Id.) Byrd allegedly “got mad[, ]
curse[d] me out, ” and told the other detective to
charge Wilborn with first-degree murder. (Id. at
also alleges that the officers did not perform a gunshot
residue test on him and did not have a warrant for his arrest
when he was pulled over. (Id. at PageID 3.) He
alleges the car he was in, which belonged to his girlfriend,
was taken for investigation but released a few weeks later.
(Id.) He asserts that he has been falsely accused of
murder, despite no investigation, by “one person that
is on drugs and in an[d] out of Jail constantly.”
(Id. at PageID 3-4.)
seeks “a real lawyer” to represent him in his
criminal case and to “settle this matter in court,
” which seems to be a request for monetary damages.
(Id. at PageID 4.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state ...