United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
CARL E. JORDAN, Plaintiff,
BILL B. LEE, Governor of the State of Tennessee, in his official and individual capacities, et al., Defendants.
A. Trauger United States District Judge
E. Jordan filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under
42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983 against Governor Bill B. Lee; Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation Director David B. Rausch; Tennessee
Attorney General Herbert H. Slatery, III; the State of
Tennessee; and an unspecified number of John and Jane Does.
(Doc. No. 1). The plaintiff is a resident of Nashville,
action presents a constitutional challenge to the Tennessee
Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration and
Tracking Act, as amended, Tenn. Code Ann. §§
40-39-201 - 218 (2019) (“the Act”), among other
the plaintiff is proceeding as a pauper in this action, the
court must conduct an initial review of the complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismiss it or any portion of
it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. In assessing
whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as construed by
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the dismissal standard
articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] because the relevant statutory language
tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)”).
se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be
liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415
Fed.Appx. 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot
create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his
pleading”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Payne v. Sec'y of Treas., 73 Fed.Appx.
836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of
complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and stating,
“[n]either this court nor the district court is
required to create Payne's claim for her”).
Section 1983 Standard
plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To
state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege
and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535
(1981) (overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998).
Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to support
a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett,
932 F.2d 502, 504 (6thCir. 1991).
complaint alleges that the plaintiff, a “Black American
Citizen, ” was released from state prison on May 2,
2005, after the expiration of his thirty-five year sentence.
The plaintiff had been imprisoned for the crimes of second
degree murder, armed robbery, and aggravated rape committed
by the plaintiff on July 11, 1980.
2, 2005, an unidentified employee of the Tennessee Department
of Correction told the plaintiff that he had to report to the
Metropolitan Davidson County Sheriff's Department to be
added to the sex offender registry.
his release from incarceration, the plaintiff has been
arrested for failure to report his change of address. He
received ten days of imprisonment in the Davidson County Jail
for failing to pay the $150 fee required under the sex
offender registry. He later was arrested again and received
three days of imprisonment in the Davidson County Jail. In
2016, the plaintiff was denied an employment opportunity
because he is on the registry.
October 7, 2018, the plaintiff wrote to the Tennessee Bureau
of Investigation (“TBI”) and requested to be
removed from the sex offender registry. On October 19, 2019,
the TBI responded, denying the plaintiff's request
because he committed a sexually violent offense and therefore
must continue to register for life while living in Tennessee
unless his conviction is overturned or he is exonerated of
his sexual conviction.
April 2019, the plaintiff was denied a trip upon a cruise
ship because he is on the registry. On April 22, 2019, the