United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (the “Report”), dated November 6,
2019. (ECF No. 44.) The Report recommends that the Court
grant in part and deny in part Defendant Dr. Mark T.
Esper's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. at 2.)
Esper objected to parts of the Report on November 20, 2019
(the “Objection”). (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff Larry
Douglas has not objected to the Report or responded to
following reasons, Esper's Objection is OVERRULED. The
Report's recommendations are ADOPTED. Esper's Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
19, 2018, Douglas filed a pro se complaint (the
“Complaint”) against Esper alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title
VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended
by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§
12112, et seq. (“ADA”). (Compl., ECF No.
1.) The Report recites the facts and background of the case.
(ECF No. 44 at 3-12.) Esper does not object to that
recitation. (See ECF No. 45.) The Court need not
repeat it here.
19, 2019, Esper filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). (ECF No. 30.) The
Magistrate Judge issued her Report addressing that Motion on
November 6, 2019. (ECF No. 44.) The Report recommends
granting summary judgment in favor of Esper on Douglas's
claims for race discrimination, color discrimination, age
discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation on
the basis of his hearing-related disability. (Id. at
2.) The Report recommends denying summary judgment on
Douglas's claims for disability discrimination and
failure to accommodate his disability on the basis of his
posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). The
Report also recommends that all of Douglas's
failure-to-promote claims be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. (Id.)
November 20, 2019, Esper objected to the Report's
recommendations in part. (ECF No. 45.) Esper objects to the
Report's legal conclusions about Douglas's claims of
disability discrimination and failure to accommodate based on
Douglas's disability of PTSD. Esper argues that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that his Motion should
be granted in full. (See id.)
Court has jurisdiction over Douglas's claims. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, United States district courts have
original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” The Complaint alleges that the Agency
discriminated against Douglas in violation of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Douglas's claims
arise under the laws of the United States.
Standard of Review
Report and Recommendation
district court has the authority to “designate a
magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary
hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by
a judge of the court, of any motion . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to
relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by permitting the
assignment of certain district court duties to magistrate
judges. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598,
602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States,
490 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1989)); see also Baker v.
Peterson, 67 Fed.Appx. 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003).
dispositive matters, “[t]he district judge must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's
disposition that has been properly objected to.”
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). After reviewing the evidence, the court is free to
accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge's proposed
findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The
district court is not required to review --under a de novo or
any other standard -- those aspects of the report and
recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should
adopt the magistrate judge's findings and rulings to
which no specific objection is filed. See id. at
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on motion of either
party, the court “shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party
must show that the nonmoving party, having had sufficient
opportunity for discovery, lacks evidence to support an
essential element of his case. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622,
630 (6th Cir. 2018).
confronted with a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A ‘genuine'
dispute exists when the plaintiff presents ‘significant
probative evidence' ‘on which a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for her.'” EEOC v. Ford
Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(quoting Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d
901, 913 (6th Cir. 2009)). The nonmoving party must do more
than simply “show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” Lossia v. Flagstar
Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The nonmovant must
identify specific evidence in the record that would be
sufficient to justify a trier of fact's decision in the
nonmovant's favor. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1);
Hanson v. Madison Cty. Det. Ctr., 736 Fed.Appx. 521,
527 (6th Cir. 2018). “[T]he disputed issue need not be
resolved conclusively in favor of the non-moving party,
[although] that party is required to present some significant
probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the
parties' differing versions of the dispute at
trial.” Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171,
1174-75 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing First Nat'l. Bank of
Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action[, ] rather than a disfavored
procedural shortcut.” FDIC v. Jeff Miller
Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
objects to specific legal conclusions in the Report. Douglas
has not objected to the Report. The Court reviews de novo
only the legal conclusions to which Esper has objected.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 150. The Court
adopts all of the Report's other legal conclusions and
proposed findings of fact. See Arn, 474 U.S. at 151.
Recommended Findings and ...