United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ARON J. AUSTIN, Plaintiff,
NICHOLAS J. TANSEY, DAVID LYNN COBB, JAMES SHAHEEN, AARON GRIGSBY, and SOUTHERN ROOFING & RENOVATIONS, LLC, Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
L. PARKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Aron Austin sued pro se alleging that Defendants violated his
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983(A), 18 U.S.C. § 242,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324c(2)(3)&(4), and under
Tennessee law. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 26.) Defendants then moved
to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (ECF No. 28; ECF No.
29; ECF No. 30.)
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant
Defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 38 at PageID
317.) For the reasons below, the Court
ADOPTS the R&R in whole and
GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss.
The Magistrate Judge's Findings
Plaintiff complains about the result of state court civil
litigation, the Magistrate Judge found that “the
exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this
case is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.” (ECF No. 38 at PageID 321-22.) “This
doctrine ‘embodies the notion that appellate review of
state court decisions and the validity of state judicial
proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review such matters.'”
(Id. at PageID 322) (citing In re Cook, 551
F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009)).
R&R explains that “it is clear that the source of
the injury underlying Austin's amended complaint is the
state court judgment against him.” (Id. at
PageID 323) (citing In re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548).
Thus, “[b]ecause this court could remedy the injury
only by reviewing the state court judgment, ‘the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from
asserting jurisdiction.'” (Id.) (citing
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.
2006)). “Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman precludes the
court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over this
Magistrate Judge also found that, even if subject-matter
jurisdiction existed here, Plaintiff does not allege any
violation under § 1983 because he fails to allege that
any of the Defendants are state actors. (Id. at
PageID 324) (citing Campbell v. PMI Food Equip.
Grp., Inc., 509 F.3d 776, 783 (6th Cir. 2007)). What is
more, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Judge David
Lynn Cobb cannot stand because the latter is judicially
immune from Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. (Id.
at PageID 325-27) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's
§ 1983 allegations “fall short” of the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard.
(Id. at PageID 323).
R&R added that Plaintiff's “amended complaint
omits the original complaint's claims based on criminal
statutes 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 8 U.S.C. §§
1324c(2)(3)&(4), although the amended complaint lists the
latter on its title page under the section labeled
‘federal statute violations.'” (Id.
at PageID 327) (citing ECF No. 26-2 at 1). But the Magistrate
Judge found that, even if Plaintiff does allege claims under
these criminal statutes, they “do not provide for a
private cause of action.” (Id. at PageID 327)
(citations omitted). Thus, “to the extent that
[Plaintiff] seeks to maintain claims under these statutes,
they should be dismissed.” (Id.) (citations
Tennessee Law Claims
the Magistrate Judge Found that, “[b]ecause this action
violates Rooker-Feldman and because the complaint
fails to state a claim against any defendant under §
1983, the court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims.” (Id.
at PageID 328) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). As a
result, he “recommended that all state law claims be
dismissed without prejudice.” (Id.)