United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
GREGORY A. GOFF a/k/a GREGORY ARNEZ GOFF, Plaintiff,
MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND, DISMISSING CASE WITH
PREJUDICE, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD
FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 3, 2020, the Court dismissed the pro se
complaint filed by Plaintiff Gregory A. Goff a/k/a Gregory
Arnez Goff, and granted leave to file an amended complaint.
(ECF No. 5.) Goff timely filed an amended complaint, (ECF No.
7), which he has titled a motion to amend; that motion is
GRANTED. In the caption of the amended complaint, Goff again
lists Madison County as the only Defendant. (Id. at
PageID 22.) Goff's amended complaint merely
realleges his concerns about the generally unpleasant
conditions of confinement at the Madison County Criminal
Justice Complex (CJC). (Id. at PageID 22-23.) He
seeks compensation of $2 million. (Id. at PageID
legal standards for assessing the claims in an inmate's
complaint were set forth in the prior order of dismissal,
(ECF No. 5 at PageID 15-16), and will not be reiterated here.
same reasons discussed in the prior order of dismissal,
Goff's amended complaint fails to state a claim. He does
not name any responsible party who may be sued under §
1983. As the Court previously noted, (id. at PageID
16-17), Madison County may be held liable only if
Goff sustained an injury due to an unconstitutional custom or
policy of the County. See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). However, Goff does
not allege that a Madison County policy is responsible for
the conditions at the CJC. Furthermore, Goff does not allege
that he personally suffered any physical injury as a result
of the conditions about which he complains. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Therefore, Goff's amended
complaint also is subject to dismissal.
Goff's amended complaint fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice
in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave to further amend is
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an
appeal by Goff in this case would be taken in good faith. The
good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The same
considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for
failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an
appeal would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, it is
CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Goff would not be
taken in good faith.
Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate
filing fee if Goff nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this
case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good
faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff's
ability to take advantage of the installment procedures in
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997),
partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain v.
Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013).
McGore sets out specific procedures for implementing
the PLRA. Therefore, Goff is instructed that if he wishes to
take advantage of the installment method for paying the
appellate filing fee, he must comply with the PLRA and
McGore by filing an updated in forma
pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his
inmate trust account statement for the last six months.
analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if
any, by Goff, this is the second dismissal of one of his
cases as frivolous or for failure to state a
claim. This strike shall take effect when
judgment is entered. See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135
S.Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015).
Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
 In his prayer for relief, Goff
“ask[s] that Madison County T.N. and Jackson
T.N.” compensate him. (Id. at PageID 23.) Goff
does not actually specify in the amendment that he is naming
the City of Jackson as an additional Defendant, and he has
included no factual allegations concerning the City. The
Court therefore declines to construe his passing reference as
an attempt to sue the City.
 Goff alleged in both the original and
amended complaints that the conditions at the CJC violate the
Tennessee Constitution. However, Tennessee does not recognize
actions for damages for violations of the Tennessee
Constitution. See Bowden Bldg. Corp. v. Tenn. Real Estate
Comm'n, 15 S.W.3d 434, 444-45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Siler v. Scott, No. ...